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Abstract
Restructurin g and nioderni :. ation of basic political institutions is the crucial key for long-
term recovery o/East Asia 's crisis economies . These steps are necessary to restore con/idence
cued allow .fi^r their economies to stabili ze as the first step towards recovery. Then they must re-
capture or reengineer their respective competitive positions in the global economy. Long-term
competitiveness will require gains in overall productivity embodied in advanced technical sYs-
tems and greater investments in human capital . Unfortunately, East Asia is lagging in these
areas. High prestige projects have given a false impression of widespread adoption of new tech-
nology that has actually been quite lowfor most of the region.
The Economic Crises Afflicting East Asia
The analysis of the East Asian crises offered herein departs from an understanding of the na-
ture of the interaction of economic and political institutions with market processes . A link is
drawn between the underlying political culture and a set of institutional arrangements that it en-
genders . In turn, this institutional infrastructure defines a set of incentives within which economic
decisions are made . Faulty institutions will send misguided signals such that decisions that ap-
pear to be rational when judged upon internal criteria are proved to be irrational and inefficient
when compared to external standards . A number of propositions or observations will be outlined
and then explored.
First, the economic crises afflicting East Asia after July 1997 can be considered to have been
self-inflicted in that they reflect a general failure of governance. In effect, the turmoil resulted
from systematic politicization of domestic financial markets. Policies of directed-development
were followed in most of the countries in the region. As such, investments for development were
directed through banks while domestic capital markets were suppressed.
Second, it follows then that global capital flows were not the cause of the crises. These foo-
tloose flows merely transmitted the message that the institutional framework of the East Asian
economies would no longer be considered to be compatible with the demands of the international
marketplace. Overall conditions of competition changed the rules of the game. Political and eco-
nomic institutions that were once thought to help promote growth in the region began to serve as a
drag. Judging from the resignation of former Indonesian President Suharto, global capital can
now he seen as a liberating force that displaces dictators and inept rulers.
(*) Christopher Lingle is a Hong Kong-based independent corporate consultant and adjunct scholar of the Centre tor
Independent Studies in Sydney who authored The Rise and Decline of the Asian Century (Seattle: The University of
Washington Press, 1998). His E-mail address is: CRL@po.cwru.edu.
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similar development policies that are evident throughout the region . As such, resolution of the cri-
ses requires radical changes that must include the introduction of greater political accountability
and increased financial transparency . Participation in the global marketplace will induce reluctant
leaders to embrace modernization of their political and economic institutions.
Fourth, before these economies can recover, they must first stabilize. Stabilization can only
begin after they reach bottom. Japan's state of arrested collapse that began at the end of the 1980s
inspires little confidence that its neighbors can act more quickly or more resolutely. There are no
good estimates of how much longer Indonesia will experience economic decline. Even though
there are some encouraging signs of progress in South Korea and Thailand, the crises are in the
early stages of Malaysia and Singapore.
Fifth, recovery from the crises involves a long-term, structural adjustment. These problems
are not merely a brief, cyclical downturn. Restoration of confidence in Asia's economic future,
and with it the return of foreign capital will depend upon a willingness to abandon culturally-im-
bedded institutions. This may require decades or even generations.
Sixth, there is a widespread misunderstanding of the modernizing process brought about by
the global economy. An oft-repeated confusion is that modernization is linked to Westernization
or even Americanization. Such suggestions are misplaced and smack of an inappropriate sense of
cultural triumphalism. Modernization is a universal process and is best interpreted as the imple-
mentation and evolution of individualist-based institutions.
Why (Free) Institutions Matter
Institutions arc systems of rules. conventions, laws or customs that serve as enabling mccha-
nisms discovered through the process of human interaction. Such arrangements emerge and en-
dure inasmuch as they reinforce stability within a community or facilitate change by reducing un-
certainty. The rule structure of institutions provides an aspect of. predictability in the course of
social interplay. This predictability arises from the incentive structures embodied in the institu-
tions that guide individual choices and shape the social impacts of these decisions.
Since institutions define incentives and impact upon choice, the overall institutional arrange-
ments have considerable economic import. In particular, markets both depend upon and set the
stage for the emergence of a contract culture and commercial morality. In turn, institutional fra-
meworks will evolve to reinforce and reward or punish actions in reference to the agreements and
the legal institutions that support them.
Virtually every country in the world has undertaken a voluntary path to participate in the in-
ternational market economy. Therefore success as measured by sustainable growth will require
an environment compatible with markets.
Countries with institutions that provide strong protections of property rights along with rela-
tively low costs for innovations can be expected to have economies that perform better. An efiec-
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of distribution in private hands . These rights require a firm legal underpinning that include consti-
tutional guarantees , effective laws , and an independent judicial system with the will and ability
for enfo rcement. Qualities of innovation and receptivity to change are not limited to the economic
realm and should include politics. In this latter regard , valuable lessons might be learned about
political and corporate accountability associated with the rise and decline of the East Asian eco-
nomies.
Cultural change and economic growth reflect the speed of learning expressed through the le-
arning process. Entrepreneurial action is the search and application of new knowledge that occurs
when there are adequate payoffs from the expense of their quests. As such, institutional arrange-
ments based upon openness and that encourage competition will offer greater opportunities for
entrepreneurial innovation. In contrast, the presence and enforcement of monopoly imposed by
government mandate will retard learning and put a brake on economic growth. Consequently, it
strong case can be made for the linkage between economic liberty, as seen in institutional arran-
gements that promote free markets, and high growth.
't'hrough the Past , Brightly
While the pace of material advance in East Asia over the past three decades has been admira-
ble, the idea of an ascendant Asian Century has proven to be fraught with difficulty. One crucial
flaw was that it was hased upon an understanding that expanding international trade is a zero-sum
game with Asia portrayed as a triune r at the expense of losers. Second, continued success with
high economic growth has proved to be more difficult than those that assumed that it would arise
from a simple extrapolation of past performance.
A fruitful approach to understanding the past and anticipating the future for East Asia lies in
an examination of the institutional arrangements and development strategies common to much of
East Asia. This requires a long view combined with an understanding of the requirements for
market-driven growth to be sustainable. Following this line of reasoning, there is good reason to
doubt rapid return to stability and a recovery in the high growth rates once enjoyed by the econo-
mies in the region.
Inherent conservatism and inflexibility of East Asia's economic and political institutions
were once widely seen as the basis of high growth in the region. However, it has become clear that
the institutional arrangements were incompatible with the demands of an increasingly efficient
global market.
In particular, the boom period for many East Asian economies was coincidental with a form
of rnrporatisnr as a guiding paradigm for economic development. This framework involves a
close cooperative relationship between politicians, technocratic bureaucrats, and an established
business elite, often with the collusion of trade unions. The German and French economies have
operated along these lines where insiders oversee policies to protect their special interests that of-
ten serve to disadvantage outsiders. In general, outsiders are consumers who pay higher prices
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that are or would be new market entrants.
Asian traditions upon economic and political structures to create a regional variant, identified
here as C'oufucian corporatism, that reflects corporate practices familiar elsewhere. For example,
key elements of Confucianism like filial piety, sacingface, and .society above self serve to rein-
force the hegemony and hierarchical political structures of Asian corporatist arrangements. In
Japan, this arrangement became known as an iron triangle wherein bureaucrats, businesses, and
politicians work together under conditions of close consultation.
Corporatist arrangements are credited with increasing harmony and cooperation in the work
place but they might simply have been coincidental with initial high rates of economic growth.
Corporatism was also associated with the original miracle economy in postwar Germany.
However, it is likely that the current economic malaise in both countries arises from rigidities as-
sociated with their institutional arrangements.
Historical experience suggests that corporatist institutions suffer from internal contradictions
in that they spawn rigidities in economic relations that retard economic growth rates. Ironically,
the institutional arrangements previously said to be part of the winning formula for many East
Asian regimes continue to undermine stabilization and inhibit recovery of their economies.
For example, the growth strategy of most East Asian countries included a substantial invol-
vement by governments. This included government-directed investment that was funded th-
rough taxes and forced savings. In addition, governments often guided hank lending to promote
export-oriented industries by offering subsidies and tax incentives to multinationals. This was
combined with capital friendly policies to encourage foreign direct investments and technology
transfers.
But most of these policies can only be part of a short-run strategy. In the face of economic
fundamentals, subsidies are unnecessary. Indeed, they are economically irrational since they
will have no positive net impact on jobs. Such attempts to protect employment in one sector
generate price distortions and misallocation of resources in other sectors that lead to offset-
ting job losses.
In sum, most governments in the region overlooked the necessary development of their in-
frastructure for their modernization. While prudent actions were often undertaken to provide phv-
.cical infrastructure (roads and railways, communications, seaport and airport facilities), there
was a neglect of the intangible infrastructure expenditures and human capital investments. In ge-
neral, this meant that the institutional arrangements were not in place that would make their eco-
nomies compatible with the changing demands of the global capital market.
The presumed successes of an Asian cnodel provided a cover for the dysfunctional demo-
cracy of one-party or one-family regimes. In most East Asian regimes, political longevity was sel-
dom a function of a true and unshakeable approval of their citizens. More often than not, electoral
success reflected a grip on power based upon either the carrot of cronyism or wielding the stick of
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teal, More henign methods involved co-opting key elements of the cis it society through trade
unions guided by supporters of the regime or tilling key university posts with sycophants or con-
cocting laws that could be used to tame the media.
An underlying element of the crises emerged from the politicization of the domestic financial
markets throughout the region. Their policy of directed development involved a purposeful wea-
kening of capital markets so that commercial and industrial investments were directed through
the banking system. Bank managers are much easier to control than are the millions of individual
investors who would participate in open markets for equities and bonds. Government-directed in-
vestments and subsidized interest rates resulted in massive conglomerates like the Japanese kei-
retsu and Korean chuebol that diverted vast amounts of funds into non-economic activities.
On the one hand, stunting the growth of long-term debt markets supported the policy objecti-
ves of the government but encouraged domestic capital to be used inefficiently. On the other
hand, in absence of an active domestic bond market, foreign portfolio funds went into the stock
market. But heavy reliance of corporate enterprises upon bank financing meant that equities were
thinly-traded and have proved to be vulnerable to tickle foreign capital flows.
Economic Growth: Inspiration ; Perspiration; Luck...?
A key element of the catch-up process in much of East Asia was the shift of labor and other
resources from agrarian production toward industrial output, especially evident in Japan, Korea,
and Taiwan. As these economies modernized, labor resources were released from farming and
were combined with increasing numbers of women seeking employment. This massive mobiliza-
tion of the overall labor force allowed a substantial boost in production when combined with new
capital investment.
The consequence of this input - driven approach to growth became the object of an interesting
and lively debate stimulated by Paul Krugman in an article in Foreign Affairs. Professor Krugman
pointed out similarities of East Asian experience with early stages of development in the USSR.
Although many of the East Asian economies have made large expenditures on physical and hu-
man capital, these actions are non-repeatable.
In this context, economic growth in much of East Asia has arisen from massive increases in
inputs that will unavoidably boost output, at least initially. Growth may continue to increase, but
it will increase at a decreasing rate. Without gains in productivity, rates of growth will eventually
decline. An economy with high rates of investment will eventually attain a higher level of income
than one with lower rates of investment, but income gains will experience diminishing returns.
Furthermore, since investment involves the sacrifice of current consumption excessive levels of
saving and investment reduce economic welfare.
Maintaining increases in productivity became more difficult as operating costs rose rapidly
in most of the high growth regions of East Asia. With rising costs exceeding productivity gains,
production facilities began to migrate to areas with lower costs and greater profit opportunities.
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This problem may become more acute in China. In early 1996, the lieiling regime rescinded
tax breaks previously offered as a lure for new foreign investments. At the same time, costs of
housing for expatriates in controlled property markets are soaring, and there is continued interfe-
rence and financial impositions from corrupt officials. Also, there is a scarcity of skilled labor and
management talent. Delivery costs are rising due to regulations in the transport industry. There
will have to be substantial increases in productivity gains or growth will begin to slow dramati-
cally.
While the economic logic in the Krugman logic is intact, the crises afflicting East Asia did
not stem from this process. In this sense, Krugman was right about the fact that growth would
slow in East Asia, but for the wrong reason. Problems with returns to scale would not likely to
have arisen until well into the next millennium.
Indeed, the miracle growth of the East and Southeast Asian economies may be no different
from the high-growth record exhibited by other countries during the early stages of development.
Most East Asian economies relied heavily upon off-the-shelf technology and access to markets in
the mature economies to fuel their growth. Without developing their own domestic entrepreneu-
rial talent and self-generated technological advance, East Asian economies will be followers, ins-
tead of world-class leaders. Like Germany and America prior to World War 1, East Asian econo-
mies benefited as much from expanding product and resource markets as they have from their
own development strategies.
The sustainability of economic growth was also undermined in those countries with a heavy
dependence exploitation of non-renewable resources. Whereas these limits occurred in the
Philippines during the 1970s, they are becoming apparent in Indonesia and Thailand. The obses-
sive drive for adding to material wealth in the short run may lead to a serious deterioration in the
environment for living generations in many of the Asian countries. In many cases, these problems
arise out of government action that leads to overzealous exploitation as politicians and bureau-
crats scramble to cut themselves in on sweetheart deals.
Authoritarianism , Collectivism and Economic Growth...?
The East Asian crises have generated a number of casualties concerning vies. on the role oaf
governments in economic development . The first is the myth that authoritarianism is good fo r
growth. A corollary to this view stressed the importance of political connections as a necessary and
sufficient condition for business success in the region . Another mistaken view was that collective
decision making would provide superior results to reliance upon individualist - based institutions.
Many Asian cultures rely upon methodical deliberation towards reaching a voluntary or enfor-
ced consensus . This tendency reflects a belief that the imposition of order provides better results
than does the messiness associated with the open discourse of competitive processes. However, a
good case can be made for encouraging involvement of a large number of free thinkers when issues
become increasingly complex. My own experience as a professor has revealed that uninitiated stu-
dents ask the most interesting questions and answers because they do not know better!
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Much of the now-dormant debate revolved , ound claims that an Asian version of democracy
combined positive features of authoritarianism with popular rule. Authoritarian regimes invoked
the notion of Asian clemocracv to hide behind a legitimizing veil while they restrained moderni-
zation and change that threatened to disrupt the political status quo.
One serious side-effect of the institutionalized collectivism common in parts of East Asia will
be an accelerated entrepreneurial brain drain. The discouragement of institutions that promote in-
dividualism frustrates native entrepreneurs who are likely to seek a more hospitable environment
outside the region. An entrepreneur does more than buy low and sell high. It is unlikely that ersatz
entrepreneurs will be able to provide the innovative spark of true entrepreneurs who improve mar-
ket efficiency by exploiting market share opportunities, or by instigating changes to the rigidified
policy framework. The subsequent shortage of domestic entrepreneurial talent eviscerates one of
the most important internal sources of innovation-based development. Consequently, these coun-
tries are likely to remain dependent upon foreigners for access to markets and creative invention.
Despite its potentially disruptive impact on one-party politics, high-growth Asian economies
must allow increased flexibility and efficiency in information flows as a precondition for future
production. Just as continued world economic growth depends upon a regime of expanding free
trade in goods and services, the modern global economy requires access to, and production of,
knowledge-based commodities. Social progress also depends upon open competition among po-
litical and cultural institutions regardless of their geographic origin. Unfortunately, many Asian
authoritarian regimes have imposed a form of cultural protectionism designed to inoculate their
citizens against modernizing influences that might encourage the liberalization of individual
rights and freedoms. I lowever, impediments to cultural and intellectual exchanges are likely to be
as self-defeating as politically-inspired trade protectionism.
The daunting challenges of the ongoing crises are especially problematic for the authorita-
rian regimes in the region. This is because successful resolution will involve choices that are an-
tithetical to one-party regimes. On the one hand, an inability or refusal to adapt to constantly
changing realities of the globalized economy will postpone the process of stabilization and push
recovery further into the future. This undoes the claim to deliver prosperity in return for popular
support. On the other hand, relaxation of government economic controls will, per se, undermine
the basis of political dominance. Furthermore, the increasingly complicated political relation-
ships that inevitably accompany economic modernization will undermine the management and
control capacity of authoritarian leadership. In the long run, East Asian authoritarian regimes
must either adapt or die, a choice faced by all economies.
Government Failures and Currency Crises in East Asia: Overinvestment or
Malinvestment...?
If KrUgman was wrong about what went wrong, what is a better explanation of the business
failures in East Asia? The surprise and confusion over the currency and financial crises sweeping
through the region in late 1997 and early 1998 reflects the belief that the fundamentals were intact
to promote economic growth. A report by the World Bank in 1994 praised the East Asia leaders-
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would be no discussion of a Iong-term crisis if the fundamentals were in place.
Following conventional wisdom, observers have interpreted the turmoil sweeping through
Asian economies as evidence that markets are irrational and unstable. A common notion is that
the East Asian economies were victims because they went too far and too fast in liberalizing their
markets. It seems as if the discussion of the East Asian development has been locked into ideolo-
gical confrontations between left and right in the West - with an ensuing loss of clarity and logic.
Most East Asian governments pursued a policy that provided government guarantees of subsi-
dized loans to specific producers for expansion of their operations that exceeded market rationality.
But it is not easy to see how these guarantees could lead to most companies overinvesting even when
they have access to foreign savings. Government subsidy costs would simply be very high. Massive
and unpopular conversions of domestic savings into taxes to pay the subsidies would then follow.
The problems confronting East Asia have arisen from a concentrated mass of distorted invest-
ments because government guarantees distorted incentives that encouraged investment based
upon technocratic or political considerations instead of commercial viability and profitability. In
absence of properly functioning domestic capital markets, funds were squandered on ill-concei-
ved projects that exposed their economies to the non-compromising market logic of global capital.
Such malinvestment occurred directly through public spending or the promotion of govern-
ment-favored businesses, like South Korea's chaebol. However, such misdirected investments are
principally inspired by monetary or credit policies. In turn, illusory signals arise so that consu-
mers and the business community misinterpret increased money and credit flows as real, perma-
nent changes in the economy instead of mere monetary changes.
Unfortunately, government-guaranteed investments divert funds that might have been placed
elsewhere in more economically rational applications. As rates of interest are forced down
through credit expansion, there is an illusion that certain activities will be more profitable, espe-
cially in higher stages of production. In effect, production is misdirected by artificial changes in
relative prices.
The extent of malinvestments depends on the vigor of the induced expansion. A vigorously
manipulated expansion in East Asia that simply ran into a financial wall was the cause of the
abrupt decline in production in the region. As investors began to understand that the boom was
unsustainable, speculative pressures were brought to bear. Although condemned by governments
in the region, the motivations behind the speculative actions were homegrown. Speculators were
acting as countervailing forces to the counterfeit expansion and provided a force that burst specu-
lative bubbles throughout the region.
Eventually every speculative bubble ends when consumers and producers realize that chan-
ges in activity are based upon an inflationary surge. Governments then must choose whether to
curb the inflationary consequences of their own loose credit policies, or succumb to self-correc-
ting forces triggered by inflation. Inflation will expose and restore the actual relations in the eco-
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ween the different parts of the economy has been reached.
Asia's problems have been heavily compounded by industry policies that have created their
own malinvestments and have added to those created by inflation. Even in the absence of inflation
these policy created malinvestment would have the effect of slowing down productivity growth.
The logic of market economics suggests that when politicians and bureaucrats rather than the
market allocate resources, there will be a decline in the rates of return on capital and productivity.
Only markets allocate to generate conditions of the highest efficiency.
Much attention has been given to the degree of corruption in Asia and its role in recent finan-
cial events. While corruption has added to the turmoil, it has not created it. Even in the total ab-
sence of corruption the meltdown would have still happened. Interventionist policies that politici-
zed financial markets made it inevitable. The blame for East Asia's crises lies with a failure of
governance, not speculators nor irrational investors nor market imperfections.
Truth Hurts : Why the East Asian Crises Surprised So Many
It is interesting to consider why economic turmoil in the region was not better anticipated.
There was no conspiracy of silence, however, there was a pattern of slinking away from the truth.
Many Asia watchers who were unable to anticipate what lay ahead apparently chose not to
see. While some were bereft of an understanding of the economic fundamentals behind the opera-
tions of markets, still others suffered from conflicts of interests that kept them from an offering
honest appraisal.
Rating agencies were of little help. As in the case of the Mexican peso crisis, their warnings
lagged behind newspaper reports that are themselves both tardy and too often uncritical.
In fairness, few journalists have the training to sniff out theoretical or practical inconsisten-
cies in economic policies. And custom or legal restraints thwart even those with the ability or an
inclination to ask the sort of tough questions that might reveal such disharmonies. Many Asian
countries require that questions be submitted in advance. In many other countries press restric-
tions or rough handling of uncooperative journalists runs the gamut of assassination to blatant
censorship to limitation of circulation of periodicals or expulsion. Local media often face similar
or even heavier constraints plus a lower level of investigative initiative based partially upon social
conventions. For example, it was nosy foreign journalists that uncovered most of Japan's big poli-
tical scandals while local coverage followed presentation in the international press.
Foreign diplomats assigned to the region or visiting politicians are congenitally loath to criti-
cize or challenge conventional wisdom. Indeed, many people assigned to the region bought into
the idea that an Asian model represented a third way between free market capitalism and socia-
lism. Consequently , they were incapable of seeing the rot beneath the surface arising from fatal
contradictions with the demands of the global economy.
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sonnet . Even though they had or could have had access that should have alerted them to impending
problems, e.g., the IMF and the governments of the affected countries were aware of the imbalances
in the financial sectors of the crisis economies. In particular, the excessive accumulation of short-
term debt was publicly accessible knowledge , but no steps were taken to rectify these problems.
Then there were the investment houses and brokers who were mostly mute or were irredee-
mably bullish on East Asia, especially those trying to sell the junk paper offered by many of the
regimes. There was also a characteristic lack of independent analysis among the region's acade-
mics that was combined with weak political oppositions. The tendency for persistent dominance
of a political party that often led to single-party states meant that parliamentary challenges were
unheard of and inquiries into potential economic disorder were few and uncritical.
Behind much of the unwillingness to see was an abiding belief that political connections
were sufficient to insure profitability. At the same time, there was a presumption that authorita-
rian regimes are inherently stable and that they contribute to economic growth. Based on these
myths, political risks were underestimated and financial risk was simply set aside because with
political support losses could be passed on to local taxpayers.
East Asia's economies exhibited a series of flaws that led to an avoidable doom. Unfortuna-
tely, there were few rewards for telling the truth and punishments were often outsized for those
who were willing to he critical.
Global Capital as Liberator of the Masses
Global capital flows have become the vanguard of a new revolution. It has undermined des-
potism, revealed the unsustainable nature of corruption and motivated change in policies that cur-
tailed domestic competition or imposed the high costs of protectionism. A key to understanding
this process is that capital can no longer be thought of as having a specific national base. A world
without national capital is one where attempts by governments to control or restrain capital will
cause it to migrate. No hegemonic forces or small groups of financiers control capital markets.
Migration of capital reflects the will of many, small individual savers in all countries who require
that their funds are placed prudentially so that they balance risks against returns.
Although there will be substantial adjustment costs , in the future there will he rounds of vigo-
rous institutional competition that will lead to the discovery of arrangements that best attract ca-
pital. This race to the top will mean that those countries with the most attractive arrangements for
capital will be rewarded with the highest rates of economic growth and joh creation.
Successful economic development in the future will depend upon it number of conditions that
shape and define the so-called global economy. Perhaps the most important momentum behind
the internationalization of economic activities arises from the high degree of capital mobility. The
capacity of capital to migrate and reside more or less at will insures that the search for the gains
from trade arising from comparative advantage is temporary, elusive, and increasingly contested.
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It w ill be incrca"ingly important that countries develop greater I Icxihility and responsiveness in
their economic and political institutions. Otherwise the automatic adjustment mechanisms that
contribute to stability and aid growth will be obstructed.
Countries wishing to he players in the global marketplace will have to face up to the implica-
tions of this simple observation. It will be as important to countries in early stages of development
that might more likely pursue development through the promotion of export-oriented production
as in more advanced economies that need to tease higher rates of growth to keep living standards
high and unemployment low in order to maintain social harmony.
Aspirants in the global marketplace that wish to remain competitive and enjoy economic suc-
cess will he guided toward policy mixes and institutional arrangements that are flexible and res-
ponsive. Otherwise, industrial and commercial aspirants will find market shares lost to competi-
tors while national economies will experience an exodus of capital. In the future of a truly global
economy, the institutions of every country will be affected by external shocks generated by repe-
titive waves of competition. Those countries with inadequate institutional flexibility will simply
break down in face of these challenges. Indeed, this is what happened when the Fast Asian econo-
mies stumbled at the first hurdle beginning in July 1997.
From the micro side, small and medium sized enterprises will be well placed with nimble res-
ponses to exploit niche opportunities. This will imply that this will work best in situations where
there is extensive domestic competition among firms, including allowing foreign producers in to
contest local markets. From the macro side, capital friendly policies combined with a liberal trade
regime will increase and enhance linkages with international markets that facilitate trade and ca-
pital flows.
There are risks and challenges associated with such arrangements. Not least of these is the
upsetting of traditional relationships that may lead to some political instability. However, the po-
litical stability associated with the cozy relationships between many Asian governments and
commercial interests has proved to be it recipe for disaster.
Unfortunately, there is impatience with certain aspects of progress in developing countries,
whether with emerging economics or not. In essence there is it presumption that the institutional
infrastructure required for long-term success in the global market can he implemented overnight.
Optimists who wish good things for the region as well as apologists for Asian values tend to over-
look several deficiencies in the institutional environment of the region. Many governments have
embraced the voting rules associated with democracy (majority rule elections). However, the
mere superimposition of such trappings upon a collectivist culture creates a number of internal,
perhaps fatal, contradictions.
In the conservative political culture seen in much of East Asia, vigorously contested , multi-
party elections are far from the norm. One-party and one-family states dominate the civic landscape.
Similarly, most countries in the region pursued similar policies for growth whereby export-
led directed development involved the politicization and underdevelopment of domestic capital
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markets. Not only did this provide opportunities for corruption and nepotism, it also led to s ubs-
tantial malinvestment whereby funds were directed towards projects with little or no economic
merit or commercial viability. Indeed, the hundreds of billions of dollars in had debt burdening
the region arose principally from these homegrown circumstances.
As a matter of policy, industrial and commercial investments were funded principally
through the banking system. This approach allowed for greater political control over investment
flows since hank managers could more easily be influenced to direct funds toward activities or
sectors favored by technocrats or politicians. While some investments were based upon techno-
cratic inspiration, political considerations and cronyism drove many others. In all these cases,
proper risk analysis was not seen as necessary since government support meant that profits would
be privatized and losses would be nationalized and paid by taxpayers.
In contrast, controlling capital markets is similar to herding a room full of'cats. Participants
are independent and disconnected with disparate plans. What links them is a desire for some suf-
ficiently high rates of return relative to associated risk by demanding that asset managers exercise
due diligence in seeking adequate information.
At the same time, the inefficiency of the underdeveloped domestic financial markets meant
that most of the economies in the region created a dependency upon international capital. In con-
trast to comments by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, the exposure of East Asian economies
to the whims of global capital reflects policy decisions by governments in the region. It reflects
the outcome of their failure of governance and is not a neo-colonial conspiracy.
East Asian leaders did not seem to realize that by engaging the world trading system, they
were riding a tiger. As in Indonesia, this tiger is global capital markets that dethrone autocratic or
inept governments. It will come as a shock to Marxists that the greatest force for democratic
change and freedom is global capital.
Modernization and Institutional Reform
Much of the high growth previously experienced by East Asian economies reflects the conti-
nuing process of the radical changes that Margaret Thatcher introduced to the world. The familiar
core of her reform package included privatization of state-run enterprises and extensive deregula-
tion to increase competition and opening up to international investments.
Many countries seeking to introduce Thatcherite reforms of their capital markets failed to un-
derstand that the most crucial contribution of the Thatcher Revolution was an accompanying re-
quirement for supportive institutional arrangements. This oversight was not accidental since it
would require a dramatic change in their respective political cultures. In sum, the full benefits of
interacting in a market-based global economy require an ascendancy of individualist-based insti-
tutions. As such, there must be a shift from collective based decision-making and control towards
arrangements wherein individuals play a decisive role in shaping political and economic out-
comes.
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In a macro context, this implies increased democratic involvement by citizens with greater
accountability for politicians. At the same time, arbitrary rule by rulers or ruling parties is repla-
ced by non-arbitrary outcomes governed by the rule of law. In a micro context, expanded indivi-
dual and private property rights allow for greater self-ownership by each and all market partici-
pants. This will allow for entrepreneurial-driven growth and will provide greater corporate
accountability.
There are few countries where Thatcher's wisdom has been completely implemented.
However, it is in East Asia where the contradictions wrought by incomplete implementation are
.so fully and fatally exposed. Throughout most of East Asia, governments impose extensive inter-
ventions into the workings of the market. Political considerations too often reflect inept and inap-
propriate interference with the logic of the market and are motivated by a collectivist mentality.
The resulting economic and political institutions tend to limit individualism. Political slogans
like society above self and the exposed nail is hammered down express the collective instincts re-
flected in many of East Asia's institutions.
For many, it is counter-intuitive that individualist-based institutions can provide social har-
mony. The political philosophy in favor of Asian values has its deepest inspiration from the idea
that individuals should transfer power and initiative to collective institutions . The fast growing
economic change of East Asia has - after almost twenty years of phenomenal growth - reached the
point of social development where it is clear that individualist-based institutions are the logical
and necessary outcome of the process of modernization.
Civil society reflects the spontaneous emergence of voluntary associations of individuals in
order to limit abuses of power by governments, groups or other individuals. These associations
may support either special interests (such as trade unions or producers groups) or may seek to
promote general interests (such as freedom of speech as advanced by a free, open media). These
groups operate to offset the type of authoritarianism advocated in the Asian values concept and li-
berate individuals in a way that is implicitly criticized by the same philosophy.
The market acts as a civilizing force upon individuals because economic exchange becomes
more impersonal. Primitive economic arrangements tend to be based upon personal relationships
that limit the scope of exchange. Under these conditions there is little mutual trust outside of na-
rrow groups defined by personal, ethnic, racial, regional or other characteristics. Those who do
not possess these specific attributes are generally the objects of discrimination. The ethos of the
group may even endorse cheating of others.
In more advanced markets, there is tendency to break down discrimination. Individuals ex-
pand their scope of trust and respect for others in order to expand their market reach to increase
their wealth. Market processes also expose people to the need for compromise and provide grea-
ter confidence in surviving what may initially appear to be chaotic change.
The economies in East Asia have been characterized by communal, personalized institu-
tions wherein individual attributes were not valued so they were sometimes discouraged. Herein
lies an important development problem in the Asian model. Since entrepreneurs are the true en-
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tions reveal that they are essentially individualists who aim to break up the economic or political
status quo.
This type of activity initiated by individual entrepreneurs is often described as creative des-
truction. Economic innovations destroy older structures because of their higher productivity. An
open economy introduces creative destruction through trade and capital flows even if domestic
innovation is low. This process works against the cozy relationships and the ideal of social stabi-
lity that have historically existed between most East Asian governments and corporations like the
keiretsu in Japan and the chaebol in Korea.
Similarly, the high value of consensus evident in East Asian political culture is counter-pro-
ductive to the modern market economy. The search for political harmony has often resulted in li-
mits upon free speech and secretive protections of information flows in order to control or shape
public opinion. These actions further restrain the entrepreneur by restraining access to informa-
tion that would inspire them to create new products or services.
The East Asian crises can be interpreted as part of the ongoing struggle in the competition
between modern, individualist-based institutions and conservative, collectivist institutions.
Resolution of the economic crises in East Asia will occur only when there is deeper commitment
to the lessons of Thatcher's grand experiment.
Into the Future, Darkly
The simple explanation for the decline of East Asia's miracle economies lies in the incompa-
tibility of their political and commercial institutions with an increasingly efficient global capital
market. While these arrangements worked under other conditions, they did not allow for a ready
response to the external competitive shocks that visited their shores.
Ultimately, those countries with the most flexible and efficient institutions that support res-
ponsive economic arrangements will attract foreign capital. These conditions underlie innova-
tion-driven growth, which differs from the sort of catch-up growth experienced of most East
Asian economies. Innovation-driven growth is long-lived, because creative problem solving and
invention constantly rejuvenate it.
In contrast, although catch-up growth may appear to be meteoric, it is short-lived because it
only represents the belated incorporation of technology or ideas that were developed elsewhere.
Thus, those governments characterized by strict and inflexible hierarchical rule will inadvertently
hinder high rates of economic growth by stunting innovation. In the context of global mega-com-
petition, such a politically self-serving approach is fatally flawed. Unless these governments can
create the intellectual environment conducive to technological innovation, the miracle of Asia's
stunning economic successes will be short-circuited. Unfortunately East Asian economies faced
the same sort of catastrophic contradictions faced by communist economies. In the end, prospects
for an Asian Century were no more likely than they were for a Soviet Century.
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competition among institutions and cultures that is as vigorous as any competition in goods and
services. This new order of expanding international trade relations has been facilitated by the
confluence of increased capital mobility and more ready access to information and technology.
Economic success in this coming era will require further separation between economic and politi-
cal spheres , greater tolerance of institutional innovation , and increased transparency and accoun-
tability of existing economic and political structures.
These conditions are as important for the mature Western economies as they are for develo-
ping economies, in Asia or elsewhere. Those regimes attempting to frustrate this marketplace of
ideas will undermine their long-term survival. Just as economic protectionism leads to avoidable
economic costs, cultural isolationism involves self-inflicted social and political costs. Neither
wishful thinking, nor strong-armed authoritarian rule, will be able revive hopes tn- an Asian
Century and neither can they hold back the positive forces of a Global Millennium.
While restoration of stability in East Asian economies will be a difficult road, the slow pace
of institutional changes will make recove rv an even longer one. Indeed, it may require a genera-
tion before some East Asian economies can replicate the required institutional infrastructure for
sustainable economic growth that will be required by the increasingly efficient global capital
market.
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